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In the contemporary world of inter- and intra-state relations the ‘Cyprus issue’ has a 
regrettably special place: because of the duration of the divisions in Cyprus itself between 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (formalized since 1983 by a disputed international 
border across the island); because of the involvement of two foreign countries, Greece and 
Turkey, for which the ‘hyphenated’ Cypriot communities form proxy (and for the most part, 
willing) battalions in their ongoing feud; and because of the failure of the United Nations’ 
longstanding efforts to resolve the conflict. Such is the depth of feeling among many Cypriots 
P a g e  | 2 
 
that simply trying to describe the last fifty years of Cyprus’s history is a minefield for the 
unwary, each side seeing the progression of events in highly partisan terms. Likewise, 
suspicion is the primary lens through which every attempt at reconciliation continues to be 
viewed. This essay will provide an overview of the ‘Cyprus issue’ against which to discuss 
the role of identity in the creation of a relatively harmonious community that forms the 
ballast of a modern state. The necessary condition for a resolution to the ‘Cyprus issue’, I 
argue, is the creation of a Cypriot identity and thus a national interest that can supersede 
existing loyalties to external states, cultures and traditions. 
*** 
As an island in the eastern Mediterranean, and a welcome port of call for sea-borne trade (not 
to mention convenient destination for conquerors and settlers), Cyprus has been subject to 
diverse cultural influences for thousands of years. In 1489, to mention only more recent 
times, it was captured by the Republic of Venice; in 1570, the Ottomans invaded; and in 
1878, the island was transferred by the Ottomans to the control of the United Kingdom. After 
a period of rising clashes with the British in the postcolonial era after the Second World War, 
Cyprus became independent in 1960. Despite the machinations of the island’s communities 
during the struggle for independence, including a failed proposal for unification with Greece, 
it is essentially from the time of independence that the ‘Cyprus issue’ emerges. Violence 
between the Turkish-oriented and Greek-oriented communities led ultimately to the 
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in 1964, the start of the longest-ever UN 
intervention that continues to this day. Ten years later, just days after an attempt by the Greek 
military junta to unite the island with Greece, including ousting the Cypriot President, 
Makarios, Turkish troops invaded on 20 July 1974 (on the grounds of protecting the Turkish 
Cypriot community) and divided the island; in 1983 this division was formalized by the 
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declaration of independence by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. Thousands of 
Greek Cypriots were displaced southwards by the invasion; thousands of mainland Turks 
were subsequently resettled in northern Cyprus. The international community does not 
recognize this ‘Republic’, but is constrained in acting against it; the displaced population and 
their descendants continue to feel aggrieved at their loss; and the passage of time conspires to 
normalize the status quo. 
The ‘Cyprus issue’ has been aggravated, if not fundamentally created, by the interference of 
colonial and other external powers. Indeed, it is the burden of Christopher Hitchens’ 
passionate but incisive analysis that: 
Only four years after they had painfully achieved independence [in 1960], the Cypriots 
became the victims of a superpower design for partition. This partition reflected only 
the strategic requirements of outside powers, and did not conform to any local needs … 
The imposition of partition [from 1974] necessitated the setting of Greek against Turk, 
and Greek against Greek.1
In Hitchens’ view, Cyprus reached its current impasse by a series of external manoeuvres, by 
Greece, Turkey and Britain, often with willing Cypriot accomplices, but exploiting and 
fanning ancient rivalries. The two most important things to know about Cyprus in the last 
couple of centuries are first how it fitted into grand power strategy and second, that the 
people of Cyprus have rarely if ever been consulted about their fate. Hitchens insisted: 
 
that before 1955 there was no history of internal viciousness in Cyprus … In his book 
Years of Upheaval … Dr Henry Kissinger … speaks of “primeval hatred of Greeks and 
Turks”, “atavistic bitternesses” and “a lethal cocktail” … In doing so, he perpetuates a 
fairly widespread and commonplace view of the island’s troubles; a fatalistic view of 
the incompatibility of the communities that insults both of them.2 
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Meanwhile the UN’s efforts—both at keeping the parties from taking up arms once again, 
and at a long-term settlement of the division—continue. In the literature on conflict 
resolution, the peacekeeping success of the UN in Cyprus has been rightly noted: there has 
been no open warfare since 1974. Bercovitch and Jackson point out that UN peacekeeping 
‘has acquired an important reputation for impartiality and professionalism.’3 But the UN’s 
many efforts at settlement have thus far signally failed. The current efforts by the UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, former Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer, 
seem unlikely to break this dismal mediation record. While it might be easy to blame Downer 
himself for incautious comments, as the Greek Cypriot side has recently done,4
The story of mediation in Cyprus can be told in terms of recurring cycles of hopes raised and 
then dashed. The most recent cycle can be charted in a series of reports by the International 
Crisis Group (ICG). In June 2008, the ICG declared the ‘Best Chance Yet’ for the 
reunification of Cyprus on the basis of the election of Demetris Christofias to the Greek 
Cypriot presidency. By September 2009, it described the state of play as ‘Reunification or 
Partition?’ if the opportunity for a settlement was not reached by April 2010 (the date of the 
then-forthcoming Turkish Cypriot elections). By February 2011, the ICG was urging ‘Six 
Steps towards a Settlement’, premised on the notion that ‘the Cyprus reunification 
negotiations under way since 2008 [are] at an impasse’.
 criticism of 
his mission reflects rather the extent of the distance and suspicion between the two sides. The 
apparent readiness of the parties to the dispute to misinterpret Downer’s statements must 
have him bemused, or perplexed. 
5
*** 
 The stalemate continues. 
Though there are a number of factors that affect the outcome of any conflict mediation, Ott 
has argued that success or failure ‘is largely determined by the nature of the dispute’.6 What, 
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then, is the nature of the Cyprus dispute? Certainly the remaining issues over property lost in 
the partition bedevil the chances for a lasting peace and an end to the island’s division; as 
does the baleful influence of outside players (notably Greece and Turkey, who have strategic 
interests in Cyprus, but who have also used the ‘Cyprus issue’ periodically as a convenient 
distraction from internal problems). But the fundamental problem in Cyprus is that it has not 
been allowed—it was not given a chance—to build a Cypriot nation after its independence 
from the United Kingdom in 1960. The absence of such a Cypriot identity was, in a sense, 
conceded by Rauf Denktaş (a former leader of the Turkish Cypriot community), who was 
quoted in the 1990s as saying that ‘in Cyprus the only thing that is Cypriot is the donkey’.7
Bercovitch and Jackson have argued that following the end of the Cold War in 1989 conflicts 
involving identity—ethnic and religious conflicts, in particular—took the place of the 
previous conflicts related to competition and scarcity. They add that: 
 
Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from the series of ICG documents cited above is 
not to place excessive hopes on particular individuals, governments or rounds of negotiation. 
The task in Cyprus is long-term; it may be assisted by the disposition of particular 
individuals, but the long-term work is the creation of a people. This means acknowledging 
the nature of the conflict as a protracted social conflict, and beginning the steps for building a 
new Cypriot sense of community. 
Denial of identity can lead to feelings of victimization that may lead to conflict, and 
conflicts that are based on identity are inherently more complicated and harder to 
resolve than those over resources. Moreover, ethnic conflict will usually take place 
within a community, and often in a community with a history of hostility, the situation 
is further complicated. Hence, words such as intractable and protracted have been 
employed to describe these new types of conflict.8 
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While noting that the Cyprus issue long pre-dates the end of the Cold War, it seems to 
prefigure these new types of conflict and should be approached in similar ways. 
In countries achieving independence in the period of decolonization, and in many of those 
democratizing in the ‘third wave’ since the mid-1970s, one of the key desiderata is the 
creation of a ‘people’ out of the human material at hand, be it divided into tribal, or ethnic, or 
religious communities. British lawyer and educator, Sir Ivor Jennings, once insightfully 
pointed to a key issue in a democracy: that ‘the people cannot decide until somebody decides 
who are the people’.9
*** 
 This means above all that in any social system where politics, rather 
than force, decides public issues, ‘the people’ must have some sense of common purpose and 
destiny. They must partake of a common spirit to the extent that they do not wish to withdraw 
from, or wreck, the system when it decides against a part, or parts, of the people. Political 
decisions involve losers as well as winners, and the longevity of the system depends on a 
continuing commitment on the part of the losers. This may be addressed, to some extent, by 
the notion that winners on some issues will be losers on others: in other words, that losers are 
not consistently losers. If there is some group, or groups, that continually ‘lose’, then the 
ability of the political system to fulfil its purpose without serious disruption is impaired. 
A level of trust is something that must operate in all continuing human groups where simple 
fear and necessity have been overcome. And it is an elementary fact of the sociology of 
enduring democracies. That a democratic political system ‘represents’ all the population, and 
not just those who voted for the incumbent government, is commonly (and properly) the 
message of elected leaders when they win power. But if problems are constructed in the 
absolutist terms of identity, rather than as an appropriate business for negotiation and 
compromise, their resolution becomes far more difficult than ordinary politics can often 
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process, and the way is opened for those who want to dominate or wreck the political system. 
Whether or not identity (especially minority identity) is protected in constitutional 
documents, as it was in Cyprus in the institutional arrangements of 1960 that included inter 
alia a constitutional guarantee that the Vice President would be a Turkish Cypriot, the 
formalities themselves are symptomatic of continuing division and the paucity of common 
ground. Yet intercommunal trust is essential in the building of any viable political 
community, and a powerful factor in their disintegration is the fear of one side or the other 
that it will be bested even despite formal guarantees. 
The Cyprus conflict falls into the category of what Edward Azar labeled ‘protracted social 
conflict’ and what John W. Burton referred to as ‘deep-rooted conflict’.10 The length of such 
conflicts stems from their connections to deeply-felt issues including identity, ideology and 
the frustration of basic human needs. As Wittig explained, long-term transformation is thus 
required, and ‘settlements reached [merely] between the political or military elites of the 
conflict groups fail to address the needs of the conflict societies [as a whole] and thus impede 
an effective conflict resolution’.11
Azar’s analysis emphasized that ‘the source of protracted social conflict is the denial of those 
elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a 
compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, 
 But Wittig’s research in Cyprus almost a decade ago 
concluded that ‘conflict resolution approaches’ had produced a transformation only among 
the Turkish Cypriot community, not in the Greek Cypriot community. The primary evidence 
she adduced was the former community’s support for, and the latter’s rejection of, a 
referendum proposal in 2004 to allow Cyprus to join the European Union as a united country. 
But to conclude that conflict resolution has failed on this basis does not take into account the 
other factors influencing the referendum results, especially when there was arguably much 
more for the Turkish Cypriot community to gain from unification. 
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and effective participation in the processes that determine conditions of security and 
identity’.12 It underlines the importance of ‘a people’—and thus trust—to the building of a 
political community, when people are divided into ‘identity groups’. The quest to find a 
Cypriot identity—to go beyond the identities grounded in a particular view of history and in 
loyalties to elsewhere—has been undermined by the machinations of Greece and Turkey, for 
whom the island populations of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots became a proxy for the 
larger, long-term dispute between these two countries, extending back for more than a 
century. This spoiling process has involved external interference but, even more importantly, 
a manipulation of identity on the island. Loizides argues that ‘Historically, both Turkish and 
Greek Cypriots have experienced strong feelings of “motherland nationalism”, namely, a 
sense of primary loyalty to the “national centers” of Ankara and Athens, respectively.’13 
While the strand of island patriotism has waxed and waned, and ‘motherland nationalism’ 
may be on the decline, he has found that that ‘the major focus of identity of Cypriots is 
identification with their respective ethnic communities in the form of Greek Cypriotism or 
Turkish Cypriotism’,14
Presenting the ‘Cyprus issue’ as a challenge of identity suggests parallels with recently 
emerged democracies. All democracies are confronted to some extent with the challenges of 
diversity; democratizing countries, too, face this issue in ways that often threaten to affect or 
even derail their transition. Most of the latter countries have emerged from periods of 
colonial dependence, which may have had adverse effects on their economies, but also affect 
their political development. Their borders, for example, may be colonial impositions or 
accommodations, with little reference to the realities of geography or ethnicity on the ground. 
Scooping up different tribal and ethnic groups, as well as different religious groups, the 
arbitrary boundaries often created by colonial powers have led to significant political 
 a mid-way point that increases the possibilities for success for those 
proposals that meet these particular constituencies. 
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challenges. Such challenges may not have been so evident when the major political objective 
was to remove the colonial overlords, but they became obvious when the question of ruling—
and the real or imagined spoils of ruling—came to be managed, or divided. The major 
challenge of post-independence was to build a sense of one people; this challenge has been 
addressed in many places in terms of nationalism. 
Nationalism is perhaps the most important type of ‘glue’ that holds modern political systems 
together; it is particularly important in modern societies which—by virtue of their large 
extent, and thus the general anonymity of citizens one from another—cannot rely on personal 
ties to bind. It creates a virtual, national ‘family’. Yet the pervasive success of nationalism 
consists in that this—essentially modern, constructed form of identity—is considered to be 
both natural and timeless. 
For Cyprus, many solutions have been suggested to satisfy the interests of the two major 
sides in one united state, from the (failed) 1960 constitution itself through subsequent 
suggestions for a federated republic and variations thereupon.15
taking the initiative in introducing a new form of government is very difficult and 
dangerous, and is unlikely to succeed. The reason is that all those who profit from the 
old order will be opposed to the innovator, whereas all those who might benefit from 
the new order are, at best, tepid supporters for him.
 But change produces fertile 
ground for ‘spoilers’. Machiavelli put this point succinctly in 1513: 
16
The success of any institutional arrangement in solving the ‘Cyprus issue’—and I have no 
elegant plan to offer in this regard—will depend on the foundational work done in building 
confidence between the two sides and in creating the sense of a Cypriot future. There lies the 
best chance of overcoming the spoilers and naysayers. 
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*** 
There is, among some Cypriots, a recognition that continued division is a continuing wound. 
The Cyprus Friendship Programme youth bicommunal group, for example, gathered together 
at the centre of the island in early 2011 to proclaim their hopes: 
This is a time to declare that forgiveness and reconciliation are not the desires of just a 
few, but the powerful voice of the people of Cyprus ... We embrace caringly everyone 
who has lost a dear one as if we are members of the same family.17
How widely this view is shared I cannot tell, but protracted social conflicts are associated 
with underdevelopment and social and economic disparities. In short, Cyprus and its peoples 
are the poorer for their conflict. 
 
Protracted social conflicts are also, by definition, not easy to resolve. Yet in my view, 
acknowledging the centrality of a lack of trust rather than a historic and irreconcilable ethnic 
divide is essential to its eventual resolution. There is a fundamental lack of trust between the 
two communities on the island of Cyprus. Negotiations between the leaders of the two sides 
have tended to be exercises in posturing and serve rather to bolster the leadership of their 
different constituencies than to resolve the problems. Good leadership will be important on 
the road to an eventual resolution, but a structural shift in the way that identities are imagined 
is essential. 
Every successful modern nation is a palimpsest of peoples, cultures and DNA, usually 
subscribing to unifying nationalist myths. Ultimately, nationalism is a choice; as Ernest 
Renan explained in 1882, nationalism is ‘a daily plebiscite’.18 And if nationalism is built in 
part on a ‘rich legacy of memories’, it is also built in part on selective forgetting.19 
Resolution of the ‘Cyprus issue’ will necessarily involve government to government 
negotiations that address the difficult property and other issues raised by the division of the 
island, as well as interactions between civil society groups and individuals on both sides to 
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reinforce the baseline of shared humanity; it may involve some innovative institutional 
arrangements; but it must also involve the recognition in some form that a Cypriot identity is 
something still to be created, debated and negotiated. Sadly, the timeframe for such a 
recognition, and for the development of such an identity, is beyond my reckoning. 
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